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AN INTERPRETIVE TURN TO PRACTICE?
Daniel Peat
*
Matthew Windsor
†
In August 2013, the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law and the Faculty
of Law at the University of Cambridge hosted a conference on the theme
Interpretation in International Law. As conveners of the conference, we were
delighted with the response to our call for papers, and the creative insights
brought to bear on a perennially popular subject in the theory and practice
of public international law. The keynote speakers included Professor Philip
Allott,1 Judge Sir David Baragwanath,2 Professor Andrea Bianchi,3 and Associate
Professor Ingo Venzke,4 and sessions were ably chaired by the likes of Professor
James Crawford AC SC5 and Sir Michael Wood.6 In their presentations and
discussions, we urged the many distinguished academics and practitioners in
attendance to consider who has or claims to have the authority to interpret in
international law, and how actors within the international legal system advance
these claims. Rather than concentrating on textual interpretation or doctrinal
exposition, we considered that the identity of the interpreters and the epistemic
communities involved in interpretation should be foregrounded.
The exceptional quality of the papers presented at the conference has given
rise to two major scholarly outputs: an edited collection titled Interpretation
in International Law, to be published by Oxford University Press in 2015;7
and this symposium, focusing on interpretation in the context of international
adjudication.
The proliferation of international courts and tribunals in recent times has
given rise to a juridification of international relations, and has significantly al-
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tered the landscape of global governance.8 Although the process of judicialisation
has been described as `uneven',9 international adjudication has had an increasing
part to play in facilitating the peaceful settlement of disputes.10 However, the
international adjudication `progress narrative' has resulted in a range of inter-
pretive dilemmas, frequently discussed in terms of regime interaction and frag-
mentation.11 The growth of international adjudication has given rise to a greater
range of actors engaged in the battle for `semantic authority' that characterises
the practice of interpretation in international law.12 Accordingly, it has become
increasingly imperative to closely analyse the interpretive approaches adopted
by different international courts and tribunals.13 Given that international courts
and tribunals inevitably `develop their own hermeneutics',14 a myopic focus on
the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is no longer sufficient
to tackle the complexities of interpretation in international adjudication.
In the first two Articles of this symposium, interpretation in international
adjudication is considered in the context of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
(STL), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU ) and theWTO Appellate
Body by authors working within those institutions. If `international law is
what international lawyers do and how they think', as Martti Koskenniemi
contends,15 we are fortunate to be privy to such candid analyses of the interpretive
inner-workings in the aforementioned adjudicatory bodies.
8
See e.g., C Romano, K Alter & Y Shany (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication
(2013); K Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (2014); C Brown, A
Common Law of International Adjudication (2007); A von Bogdandy & I Venzke, In Whose Name?
A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication (2014, in press); and A Paulus, `International
Adjudication' in S Besson & J Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (2010) 207.
9
B Kingsbury, `International courts: uneven judicialisation in global order' in J Crawford & M
Koskenniemi (eds), The Cambridge Companion to International Law (2012) 203, 211–15.
10
J Klabbers, International Law (2013) 163.
11
For differing perspectives, see UN International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International
Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006; P Webb, International Judicial Integration and Fragmentation
(2013); A Nollkaemper & O Fauchald (eds), The Practice of International and National Courts
and the (De-)Fragmentation of International Law (2012); and M Young (ed), Regime Interaction in
International Law: Facing Fragmentation (2012).
12
I Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law (2012) 62–4.
13
See e.g., J Pauwelyn&MElsig, `The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations
across International Tribunals', in J Dunoff & M Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on
International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (2013) 445.
14
Kingsbury, above n 9, 204.
15
MKoskenniemi, `Between Commitment and Cynicism: Outline of a Theory of Law as Practice',
in The Politics of International Law (2011) 271, 293.
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In an article based on his keynote address, Judge Sir David Baragwanath, the
President of the STL, reflects on the challenges of interpretation in international
adjudication across the common law/civil law divide. The ability to bridge these
legal traditions assumes particular relevance in the STL, the controversial UN-
sponsored international criminal tribunal tasked with applying the substantive
criminal law of Lebanon.16 Baragwanath, whose professional background is as
a common law judge,17 provides an illuminating discussion of the relationship
between interpretation and international law-making, the tensions between in-
terpretive certainty and flexibility, and the need for an interpretive test predicated
on the `highest standard of practical necessity'. He contends that the interpreter
must examine legal issues `through a periscope that lifts one's vision beyond the
confines of our own particular experience', enabling one to select the path that
most readily responds to the exigencies of the case at hand. Baragwanath argues
that common law and civilian legal traditions share origins and aims that often
help unite their approach across the interpretive divide; it is the adherence to
these values that form the bedrock of the interpretive approach of the STL.
The following article deals with treaty interpretation in the CJEU and the
WTO Appellate Body. Authored by Andreas Sennekamp and Isabelle Van
Damme,18 a Counsellor at the WTO Appellate Body Secretariat and Référendaire
at the CJEU respectively, this contribution provides the reader with a valuable
insider's perspective into the interpretive practices of the two institutions. The
article begins by providing a general background to the adjudicatory practices
of the CJEU and the Appellate Body, highlighting elements of the institutional
context that shape the judicial function of each tribunal. The interpretive
approaches of the CJEU and the Appellate Body are often juxtaposed in academic
analysis; the former noted for its teleological approach and attachment to
effectiveness, and the latter for adopting a strict textualist approach.19 Moving
away from a simplistic analysis that attributes this divergence to fundamentally
16
See generally A Alamuddin, N N Jurdi and D Tolbert (eds), The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Law
and Practice (2014).
17
Prior to joining the STL, Judge Sir David Baragwanath was a Judge of the Court of Appeal of
New Zealand.
18
See also I van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (2009). See M Waibel,
`Demystifying the Art of Interpretation' (2011) 22 EJIL 571, 588: `With this book at hand, there is
no risk that the novice, much less the cognoscenti, will miss the forest for the trees'.
19
See e.g., N Fennelly, `Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice' (1996) 20(3) Fordham
ILJ 656, 664. Cf W Magnuson, `WTO Jurisprudence and its Critiques: The Appellate Body's
Anti-Constitutional Resistance' (2010) 51 Harvard ILJ Online 121, 124-29: `[The interpretive
approach of the Appellate Body] is textualism run amok'.
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different views regarding the rules of treaty interpretation, Sennekamp and Van
Damme attempt to frame the interpretive practice of each adjudicatory body
within their respective institutional contexts, arguing that legal and extra-legal
constraints must be borne in mind when analysing the approaches that the
CJEU and Appellate Body adopt. The linguistic and procedural practices of the
adjudicatory body, as well as the character of the legal text, frame the approach
to treaty interpretation that each body takes. The methodology of this article is
a timely reminder that interpretation cannot, and should not, be divorced from
the context in which it occurs.
The final three articles in the symposium all deal with interpretation in the
context of international human rights adjudication.
Shai Dothan's article explores the phenomenon, and permissibility, of ex-
pansive interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights. Expansive in-
terpretation refers to the interpretive techniques employed by the Court to ex-
pand states' human rights obligations beyond the obligations states undertook
when ratifying the Convention. Although expansive interpretation has been chal-
lenged on the basis that it undermines the democratic decisions of signatory
states, Dothan examines two contexts in which expansive interpretation is con-
sistent with democratic theory: first, when the refusal by a small group of states
to amend the Convention means that the democratic will of representative states
is not fully reflected in the treaty text; and second, in situations where states mis-
represent the interests of individuals affected by their human rights policies, in-
cluding individuals who cannot vote and `discrete and insular minorities'.20 In
such situations, Dothan argues that expansive interpretation is a necessary cor-
rective to democratic failure and enhances the Court's normative legitimacy.21
For Dothan, an expansive interpretive posture may have purchase in other inter-
national adjudication contexts, where states' treaty obligations do not represent
the views of states and their citizens.
Jure Vidmar's article is a searching analysis of the interpretation of democracy
in judicial practice as opposed to political theory.22 It focuses on judicial inter-
pretation of the so-called `democratic rights' in a range of human rights treaties
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European
20
United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144 (1938).
21
For further discussion of judicial tactics employed by international courts to maximize their
reputational gains, see S Dothan, Reputation and Judicial Tactics: A Theory of National and
International Courts (2015, in press).
22
See also J Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law: The Emergence of New States in
Post-Cold War Practice (2013).
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights. Although the wording of the rights in each instrument is al-
most identical, international courts have developed different understandings of
democracy through interpretation, in the absence of an authoritative definition.
Vidmar demonstrates that judicial interpretation of the right to political partic-
ipation has resulted in multi-party elections being prescribed as the preferred
institutional setting in international human rights law. Indeed, some courts have
limited the possibility of independent candidates participating outside the party
politics framework. Vidmar also canvasses a more substantive conception of
democracy that is emerging through judicial interpretation of the `necessary in
a democratic society' limitation clause, whereby exercise of the democratic rights
is limited in order to protect democracy. Thus, the article cogently highlights the
role of international adjudication in interpreting legal obligations generated by
the principle of democracy.
In the final article of the symposium, Diane Desierto and Colin Gillespie ad-
dress the interpretation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) by a pluralist community of institutional interpreters
including the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and a range
of international and national courts and tribunals. Desierto and Gillespie artic-
ulate an interpretive paradigm for the authoritative determination of interna-
tional responsibility for violations of ICESCR. They focus on normative justi-
ciability (the precision of ICESCR rights and amenability of application by judi-
cial or quasi-judicial bodies) and institutional justiciability (the competence of a
tribunal to adjudicate or assess violations of Covenant rights). In terms of nor-
mative justiciability, the authors foreground the `minimum core content' of ICE-
SCR obligations that are jointly determined by each State Party with the Com-
mittee upon accession, in conjunction with the principles of non-discrimination,
non-retrogression and progressive realisation. Regarding institutional justicia-
bility, the authors argue that the proliferation of authoritative interpreters ex-
plains the diversity of forms of relief granted for ICESCR violations. Desierto
and Gillespie's comprehensive analysis of interpretive practice under ICESCR is
both timely and instructive, in the context of a symposium on international ad-
judication: timely, given the recent quasi-adjudicative competences conferred on
the Committee under the ICESCR's Optional Protocol;23 and instructive, in its
23
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
entered into force on 5 May 2013. See also D Desierto & C Gillespie, `Evolutive Interpretation
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salutary reminder that the interpretation of international law norms is not the
exclusive domain of international adjudication.24
The majority of the articles in the Symposium demonstrate the analytic
value of a `turn to practice' when considering interpretation in international
adjudication.25 The extensive practical experience of Baragwanath, Sennekamp
and VanDamme is brought to bear in their rich discussion of interpretation in the
STL, the WTO Appellate Body and the CJEU. Meanwhile, Vidmar, Desierto and
Gillespie orient their discussion around a detailed consideration of interpretive
practice. However, the value of theory in the context of interpretation in
international law has not diminished, as evidenced by our forthcoming co-edited
book on the subject.26 As Anne Peters has argued, international legal scholarship
can `support practice by pursuing a via media between infertile alienation from
and fetishism with practice'.27 Dothan's chapter exemplifies the enduring virtue
of doctrinal analysis complemented by theoretical research, in his transposition
of democratic theory from the domestic constitutional context to a consideration
of the appropriate interpretive posture of the European Court of Human Rights.
The Interpretation in International Law conference and this symposium would
not have been possible without the help of many. We thank the symposium
authors for their articles; the other speakers and session chairs at the conference;
our sponsors including Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press,
Hart Publishing, Ashgate and Gonville & Caius College; and the CJICL editorial
team for their assistance.
and Subsequent Practice: Interpretive Communities and Processes in the Optional Protocol to
the ICESCR' (2013) 73 ZaöRV 549.
24
J Dunoff & M Pollack, `Reviewing Two Decades of IL/IR Scholarship: What We've Learned,
What's Next' in J Dunoff & M Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and
International Relations: The State of the Art (2013) 626, 635–6.
25
Johns discusses the `turn to practice' as follows: `an orientation towards knowledge practices is
associated less with analysis of inputs and outputs or causes and effects, than with immanent,
critical investigation of the patterned activities and often mundane modes of work in which
social knowledge-makers engage': F Johns, Non-Legality in International Law (2013) 23.
26
Bianchi, Peat & Windsor, above n 7.
27
A Peters, `Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endeavour' (2013) 24 EJIL 533, 533.
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